Callahan v Philadelphia by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2000 
Callahan v Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Callahan v Philadelphia" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 67. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/67 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 28, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-1816 
 
THOMAS A. CALLAHAN, IV, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, RISK MANAGEMENT; 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
WARRANT DIVISION OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, MUNICIPAL 
COURT EVICTION UNIT; RICHARD ZIA 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 99-00918) 
District Judge: Honorable Charles R. Weiner 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2000 
 
BEFORE: MANSMANN, GREENBERG, and ALARCON,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 28, 2000) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* Hon. Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
 
       James J. McEldrew, III 
       Thomas A. Lynam, III 
       One Liberty Place, Ste. 5050 
       1650 Market Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       Howard M. Holmes 
       David M. Donaldson 
       Zygmont Pines 
       Administrative Office of PA Courts 
       1515 Market Street, Suite 1414 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
       Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
       Warrant Division of the Division of 
       the First Judicial District and 
       Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
       Municipal Court Eviction Unit 
 
       William F. Martin 
       Acting City Solicitor 
       Sarah E. Ricks 
       Deputy City Solicitor, Appeals 
       1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee City of 
       Philadelphia 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Thomas A. Callahan, IV, appeals by leave granted on 
October 1, 1999, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b)(2), from 
an amended order entered August 25, 1999, in the district 
court and from an earlier order entered April 23, 1999. The 
August 25, 1999 order certified that the district court's 
 
                                2 
 
 
April 23, 1999 order dismissing the action against two 
defendants involved a controlling issue of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and 
that an immediate appeal from that order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 
 
Callahan commenced this action by filing a complaint in 
the district court on February 22, 1999, against four 
defendants which he named as (1) City of Philadelphia Risk 
Management; (2) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Warrant 
Division of the First Judicial District; (3) Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Municipal Court Eviction Unit; and (4) 
Richard Zia. We refer to the Warrant Division and Eviction 
Unit as the judicial defendants. In his complaint, Callahan 
asserted that Zia is a law enforcement officer employed by 
the judicial defendants which were responsible for his 
training and supervision and which issued him firearms. 
Callahan alleged that Zia, while acting as a law 
enforcement officer, beat and arrested him leading to Zia's 
prosecution and conviction of serious state crimes. 
Callahan further alleged that the judicial defendants and 
the City were liable to him under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for their 
deliberate indifference and failure to train Zia adequately 
and that Zia was liable to him under section 1983 and the 
common law. 
 
The judicial defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the jurisdictional theory that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred the action against them and on the statutory 
construction theory that they are not "persons" under 
section 1983 and thus cannot be found liable. The district 
court granted the motion on the latter ground in a 
memorandum opinion and the order entered April 23, 
1999. In its opinion, the district court pointed out that 
under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 901, 911, and 1121 (West 
Supp. 1999), the First Judicial District "is one of sixty 
judicial districts in the Commonwealth and that the 
Municipal Court is a trial court within the First Judicial 
District." Thus, the court found "as a matter of law that 
both are part of the Unified Judicial System of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the supervision of 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," citing Pa. Const. art. 
V. It then held that "it is well established that state judicial 
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entities are not persons within the meaning of S 1983," 
citing Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F. Supp. 758, 764 (E.D. Pa. 
1991), as well as the cases Pokrandt cited. The court did 
not consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Callahan 
moved for reconsideration but the district court denied that 
motion on July 14, 1999. The court subsequently entered 
the August 25, 1999 order, following which we granted 
leave to appeal. 
 
The district court is exercising jurisdiction in this matter 
under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a)(1), (3) and (4), and 1367. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) and 
exercise plenary review. See McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S.Ct. 182 (1999). 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Initially, we emphasize that the distinction between the 
Eleventh Amendment and 42 U.S.C. S 1983 defenses the 
judicial defendants have raised should be kept clear. While 
the judicial defendants urge that we affirm on both bases 
there is a difference between them, although in some cases 
they will overlap. Thus, we do not doubt that an action for 
damages under section 1983 brought unambiguously 
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a district 
court would face insurmountable hurdles, both because the 
Commonwealth is not a person within section 1983 and 
because the Eleventh Amendment would bar the court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the action. Yet the overlapping 
is not complete because the Commonwealth would not be a 
person within section 1983 even if sued in a state court, 
though it could not raise an Eleventh Amendment objection 
in such a forum. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Similarly, the Eleventh 
Amendment may bar an action against a state in a federal 
court even though it is not brought under section 1983. See 
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999). 
 
That said, we still think it appropriate to make our 
section 1983 analysis by considering the three factors we 
set forth in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 
Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), in determining 
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whether the defendant there had an Eleventh Amendment 
defense, even though Fitchik was not a section 1983 action. 
In Fitchik, building upon our earlier decision in Urbano v. 
Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1969), we 
indicated that the following factors are appropriate to 
consider: 
 
       (1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment 
       would come from the state (this includes three of the 
       Urbano factors -- whether payment will come from the 
       state's treasury, whether the agency has the money to 
       satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has 
       immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's 
       debts); 
 
       (2) The status of the agency under state law (this 
       includes four factors -- how state law treats the agency 
       generally, whether the entity is separately incorporated, 
       whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own 
       right, and whether it is immune from state taxation); 
       and 
 
       (3) What degree of autonomy the agency has. 
 
Id. at 659. We then indicated that "[a]lthough no single 
Urbano factor is dispositive, the most important is whether 
any judgment would be paid from the state treasury." Id. 
We believe, however, that this factor is less significant in a 
section 1983 "person" analysis than in an Eleventh 
Amendment jurisdictional analysis. In this regard, we 
observe that the Eleventh Amendment's central goal is to 
prevent entry of federal court judgments that must be paid 
from the state treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 
651, 664-70, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356-59 (1974). On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Department of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, approached the 
question of whether a state is a person within section 1983 
simply as a statutory construction matter. 
 
While we are not certain as to what would be the source 
of funds to pay a judgment against the judicial defendants, 
Callahan argues that it would be the City and not the 
Commonwealth and we will assume that he is correct in 
this assertion. Of what we are certain, however, is that the 
judicial defendants receive funding from both the 
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Commonwealth and the City.1 The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has described the local funding of the 
Pennsylvania courts as follows: 
 
       The Judicial Code requires that County officials 
       provide adequate staff for the courts: 
 
       Whenever necessary, it shall be the duty of county 
       officers to appoint or detail such county staff as shall 
       enable the judges of the courts embracing the county 
       to properly transact the business before their 
       respective courts. 
 
       42 Pa.C.S.A. S 2302. Further, the County is required to 
       establish and maintain a judicial and related account. 
       42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3541. Out of this account the County 
       must pay: 
 
       (1) Salaries, fees and expenses of: 
 
       (i) Appointive judicial officers. 
 
       (ii) Other system and related personnel which by 
       statute are required to be paid by the political 
       subdivision. 
 
       (2) Salaries, fees and expenses of jurors, witnesses 
       and all other persons paid under authority of law by 
       the political subdivision for the maintenance of 
       judicial and related functions. 
 
       42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3544. The Code also provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided by statute, each county 
       shall continue to furnish to the court of common 
       pleas and community court embracing the county, to 
       the minor judiciary established for the county and to 
       all personnel of the system, including central staff 
       entitled thereto, located within the county, all 
       necessary accommodations, goods and services 
       which by law have heretofore been furnished by the 
       county. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Philadelphia as a governmental entity for purposes of this opinion is 
in the position of a county but we nevertheless refer to it as "City" as 
is 
 
customary. 
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       42 Pa.C.S.A. S 3722. Finally, we note that the Second 
       Class County Code mandates that a salary board shall 
       fix the compensation of certain court employees: 
 
       The board, subject to limitations imposed by law, 
       shall fix the compensation of all appointed county 
       officers, and the number and compensation of all 
       deputies, assistants, clerks and other persons whose 
       compensation is paid out of the county treasury, and 
       of all court criers, tipstaves and other court 
       employes, and of all officers, clerks, stenographers 
       and employes appointed by the judges of any court 
       and who are paid from the county treasury. 
 
       16 P.S. S 4823. See also The County Code, 16 P.S. 
       S 1623, where similar obligations are imposed upon 
       counties of the third through eighth classes. In sum, it 
       is apparent that the General Assembly intended to 
       create a legislative scheme in which funding of the 
       various judicial districts was primarily a responsibility 
       of the counties, and that these responsibilities include 
       the funding of salaries, services and accommodations 
       for the judicial system. 
 
County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 762- 
63 (Pa. 1987).2 
 
The judicial defendants in their brief supplement the 
Supreme Court's explanation of judicial funding by pointing 
out the following with respect to state funding: 
 
       The Commonwealth's FY 1999-2000 annual budget, 
       Act No. 1A of 1999, provides over $55,000,000 for the 
       salaries and expenses of common pleas judges 
       statewide; over $44,555,000 for the salaries of district 
       justices; about $4,400,000 for Philadelphia Municipal 
       Court judges (as well as nearly $40,000 for Municipal 
       Court law clerks); $650,000 for Philadelphia Traffic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In County of Allegheny the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was 
concerned with court funding on a state-wide basis. Nevertheless, its 
particular reference to second class counties is understandable as the 
County of Allegheny is a Second Class County. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, 
S 210(2) (West Supp. 1999). Philadelphia is, however, a First Class 
County. Id. S 210(1). 
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       Court judges and $1,200,000 for Pittsburgh Magistrate 
       Court judges. The state budget also provides: 
       $3,500,000 for senior common pleas judges; nearly 
       $750,000 for common pleas judicial education; 
       $500,000 for district justice education; and, $200,000 
       for domestic violence services provided through 
       Philadelphia Municipal Court. 
 
       The state budget also provides $30,400,000 directly 
       to the counties as reimbursement for the costs incurred 
       by the counties in providing for the courts of common 
       pleas, at the rate of $70,000 for each authorized 
       common pleas judge position, of which there are 90 in 
       the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 42 
       Pa. C.S. S 911 (1999 Supplement). The state budget 
       further provides over $18,000,000 for the Statewide 
       Judicial Computer System, which benefits all courts in 
       the Commonwealth. 
 
       Pursuant to the mandate of County of Allegheny , 
       . . . the Legislature has now provided $13,136,000 for 
       the transfer of lower court administrators and their 
       deputies to the state payroll and enacted the enabling 
       legislation, Act. No. 12 of 1999, to effect this transfer. 
 
Br. at 22-23 (footnote omitted). 
 
Callahan does not dispute the foregoing, for he indicates 
in his reply brief that: 
 
       The Commonwealth has provided a lengthy recitation 
       of its 1999-2000 annual budget in which it states that 
       it pays for Common Pleas Judges, District Justices, 
       Municipal Court Judges, Municipal Court Law Clerks, 
       Philadelphia Traffic Court Judges, Pittsburgh 
       Magistrate Judges, Senior Court Common Pleas 
       Judges, Common Pleas Judicial Education, and District 
       Justice Education, none of which was ever contested by 
       appellant. 
 
Reply Br. at 6. Thus, as we have indicated, both the 
Commonwealth and the City fund the judicial defendants. 
In the circumstances, we believe that consideration of the 
source of funding of the courts is of limited utility in 
determining whether the judicial defendants are persons 
under section 1983. 
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The second Fitchik factor requires an inquiry into the 
status of the judicial defendants under state law, i.e., 
"whether state law treats an agency as independent, or as 
a surrogate for the state." Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662. The 
third Fitchik factor is the judicial defendants' "degree of 
autonomy" from the state, the greater the autonomy the 
more likely that the defendants would be regarded as 
distinct from the state and thus be treated as persons 
under section 1983. Plainly, these factors overlap and thus 
we treat them together. 
 
Application of the second and third Fitchik factors 
conclusively demonstrates that the judicial defendants are 
not persons within section 1983. The Pennsylvania 
constitution provides for the vesting of the Commonwealth's 
judicial power in a "unified judicial system" which includes 
all of the courts in Pennsylvania. Pa. Const. art. V, S 1. 
Moreover, the constitution provides that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court will exercise "general supervisory and 
administrative authority" over the unified judicial system. 
Pa. Const. art. V, SS 1, 2, and 10. All courts and agencies 
of the unified judicial system, including the Philadelphia 
Municipal Court, are part of "Commonwealth government" 
and thus are state rather than local agencies. See Pa. 
Const. art. V, S 6(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 102 (West 
Supp. 1999); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 301 (West 1981). 
 
The Pennsylvania court system is divided into 60 judicial 
districts within each of which the judges of the courts of 
common pleas are elected. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 901(a) (West Supp. 1999). The legislature may alter the 
number and boundaries of the districts only with the advice 
and consent of the Supreme Court. See Id.S 901(b). The 
position of the Philadelphia courts within this unified 
judicial system is quite clear for as the court said in 
Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
827 F. Supp. 1210, 1211 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1993), "[t]he Court 
of Common Pleas . . . and Philadelphia Municipal Court are 
trial courts within the First Judicial District, the territorial 
jurisdiction of which is Philadelphia." Remarkably, 
Callahan seems to recognize that the judicial defendants 
are state entities. Indeed, he has sued them as 
"Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" in each instance before 
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describing them in more detail. Moreover, as the quotation 
above from his reply brief demonstrates, he even refers to 
the judicial defendants on this appeal as "the 
Commonwealth." Quite naturally the judicial defendants 
have seized on this characterization to contend that they 
are not persons within section 1983. 
 
The judicial defendants point out that "[t]he Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has no doubt about its supervisory 
and administrative authority over the lower courts," and, as 
particularly germane here, the Philadelphia courts. Br. at 
16. Thus, in December 1990 the Supreme Court, concerned 
with "serious and ongoing fiscal and administrative 
problems in the Philadelphia Courts," see Petition of Blake, 
593 A.2d 1267, 1268 (Pa. 1991), by administrative order 
designated two justices to oversee directly the First Judicial 
District. When the justices implemented this administrative 
order by directing the president judge of the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas to make far-reaching personnel 
changes, he challenged this order. The Supreme Court in 
Petition of Blake, 593 A.2d at 1268-69, rejected this 
challenge, holding: 
 
       Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which 
       defines the judiciary, begins with the words:`The 
       judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in 
       a unified judicial system. . . .' Within this unified 
       system, it is required that `[t]he Supreme Court shall 
       exercise general supervisory and administrative 
       authority over all the courts. . . .' Art. V, S 10(a). In 
       furtherance of that responsibility, this court has for 
       some time monitored the administration of the courts 
       of Philadelphia with increasing unease. 
 
. . . 
 
       [P]ursuant to the Constitution and the Judicial Code, it 
       is fully within this Court's authority to prescribe the 
       powers and duties of the president judges and any 
       limitations thereon. The Constitution does no more 
       than establish the office of president judge and the 
       manner in which it shall be filled. 
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. . . 
 
       [T]he Supreme Court as the governing authority, 42 
       Pa.C.S. S 102, has the power to alter the duties of 
       president judges described elsewhere in the statute. To 
       the extent that they affected the powers of President 
       Judge Blake, the Order of December 19, 1990 and the 
       April 17, 1991 directive of Mr. Justice Papadakos are 
       consistent with this authority as well as the Court's 
       general supervisory and administrative authority over 
       the unified judicial system, Pa. Const. Art. V, Section 
       10(a). 
 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its supervisory 
authority over the lower courts in First Judicial District v. 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 727 A.2d 1110 
(Pa. 1999). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, even though a 
state agency, could not review employment decisions of the 
First Judicial District or any lower court. In this regard the 
court held that: 
 
       Such interference in the operation of courts is 
       prohibited by the separation of powers doctrine. The 
       supreme court has the sole power and the 
       responsibility to supervise the `practice, procedure, and 
       the conduct of all courts.' Neither the legislative branch 
       nor the executive branch of government acting through 
       an administrative agency may constitutionally infringe 
       on this judicial prerogative. 
 
727 A.2d at 1112 (footnote omitted). 
 
The authorities we have reviewed make it perfectly clear 
that the judicial defendants are not independent of the 
Commonwealth and hardly can be regarded as having 
significant autonomy from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. They are part of the unified judicial system subject 
to the control of the Supreme Court. Thus, while it is true 
that the judicial defendants largely are funded locally, we 
hold that they are not persons within section 1983. See 
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 
F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (A Los Angeles trial court 
though largely funded by the county is state agency for 
Eleventh Amendment purposes because "state case law and 
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constitutional provisions make clear that the Court is a 
state agency."). 
 
In reaching our result, we make two further observations. 
First, we have not overlooked Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 
181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 499 (1999), 
on which Callahan strongly relies. In Carter, we held that 
the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office was not entitled 
to Eleventh Amendment immunity, at least with respect to 
administrative functions. Carter plainly is distinguishable 
as the following quotations from the opinion demonstrate: 
"Pennsylvania's Constitution expressly defines District 
Attorneys as county rather than state officers." id. at 349; 
"Pennsylvania statutes also reflect the local status of the 
DA's Office." id.; "Consistent with its constitutional and 
statutory law, Pennsylvania case law defines district 
attorneys -- Philadelphia District Attorneys in particular -- 
as local, and expressly not state, officials." id. at 350. The 
judicial defendants simply are not in the same position as 
district attorneys with respect to their relationship with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Our second observation is that while, as the judicial 
defendants recognize, br. at 11, we seem not to have 
decided the issue in any published precedential opinion, 
the district courts repeatedly have held that all components 
of the judicial branch of the Pennsylvania government are 
state entities and thus are not persons for section 1983 
purposes. See Pokrandt v. State, 773 F. Supp. 758; Mathias 
v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 576 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. 
Pa. 1983); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Pa. 
1977); County of Lancaster v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 386 F. 
Supp. 934 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Thus, our opinion is consistent 
with the reported decisions in similar situations. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of 
August 25, 1999, and April 23, 1999. 
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